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Abstract
Post-quantum cryptography is inevitable. National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) starts standardizing quantum-resistant public-key cryptography (aka post-
quantum cryptography). The reason is that investment in quantum computing is blooming
which poses significant threats to our currently deployed cryptographic algorithms. As a
security engineer, to prepare for the apocalypse in advance, I’ve been watching the de-
velopment of quantum computers and post-quantum cryptography closely. Never mind, I
simply made up an excuse to study these fascinating scientific fields :) However, they are
extremely hard to understand, at least to an amateur like me. This article shares with you
my notes with the hope that you will have an intuitive understanding of the beautiful and
mind-blowing quantum algorithms and post-quantum cryptography.
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Introduction
To understand post-quantum cryptography, we have to understand quantum mechanics and
quantum computers. Therefore, before studying post-quantum cryptography, I bought the classic
book ”Quantum Computation and Computation Information” by Michael Nielsen and Isaac
Chuang [1]. The book was too advanced to me, so I took an excellent approachable quantum
computation course by Umesh Vazirani [2]. In fact, I learned most quantum computation from
Vazirani’s course. Later on, I’ve realized that understanding quantum computers has nothing to
do with understanding post-quantum cryptography. It was too late. I couldn’t unlearn what I
have learned. Therefore, I’ll describe both quantum computers and post-quantum cryptography
to make sure that you will make the same mistake as I did :) Joking aside, as a security engineer
who is trained with ”trust, but verify” mindset, I feel guilty to blind trust that Shor’s quantum
algorithms [3] break our current cryptographic protocols.
After ”wasting” our time studying quantum algorithms, we’ll study post-quantum cryptog-
raphy. As Shor’s algorithms solve factoring and discrete log problems in polynomial time, cryp-
tographers had to find alternative cryptographic constructions that are presumably safe against
quantum computers. The following cryptographic constructions are selected to advance to the
2nd round in NIST’s post-quantum cryptography competition [4]: lattice-based cryptography,
hash-based digital signature, code-based cryptography, multivariate public key cryptography and
supersingular elliptic curve isogeny. I feel a headache just by reading these names :) They’re
independent of each other and each topic deserves its own research, so I’ll describe them one-by-
one in later chapters. They’re are all difficult to understand, but the most challenging obstacle
is to overcome our fear in dealing with them. No worries, if you can’t understand them, blame
me for not explaining them well :)
1 Quantum Computation
Have you ever played computer games? American player Kyle Giersdorf won 3 million on the
Fortnite game. Computer games are ruling the world, so I recommend you stop reading this
article, instead go and play games :) Computer games are a strange world where games’ creators
invent rules and players follow with no questions asked. In the same spirit, we’ll follow quantum
computers’s rules, play along and design quantum algorithms based on its rules. The rules are
strange but they’re not stranger than computer games’ rules. Furthermore, we’ll study quantum
computation without saying a word about quantum physics. I don’t even try to understand
quantum physics because I don’t want to be crazy :)
1.1 Quantum computers
To describe a classical computational system, we define its state, how to change its state and
how to measure its state. For instance:
• State: n bits x = x1, x2 · · · , xn represented by n transistors.
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• Classical logic gates such as NOT, AND, OR, NAND, etc are used to change x1, x2, · · · , xn.
• Measurement: measure the transistors, based on transistors’ voltages, we’ll get n output
bits.
In a similar way, to describe quantum computational system, we’ll define quantum state,
quantum gates and quantum measurement.
1.1.1 Quantum state
In classical computers, a bit is either 0 or 1 at any moment. In quantum computers, a quantum
bit (aka qubit) can exist at both states 0 and 1 at the same time. In fact, a qubit is a superposition
of states |0〉 and |1〉: |q〉 = α0 |0〉 + α1 |1〉 where the amplitudes α0, α1 are complex numbers.
On the one hand, the ket |〉 notation |q〉 , |0〉 , |1〉 just means quantum states, instead of classical
ones. On the other hand, |q〉 denotes the state vector |q〉 =
(
α0
α1
)
= α0 |0〉+ α1 |1〉.
Is it strange that α0, α1 are complex numbers instead of real numbers? It’s even stranger to
learn that we never have access to α0, α1. As we’ll see in the later section, when we measure
|q〉, we’ll get |0〉 with probability |α0|2 and |1〉 with probability |α1|2. I.e., we can observe
these complex numbers’ magnitudes (which are real numbers), but not the numbers themselves.
Nature is mysterious!
Generalize the previous paragraphs, 2 qubits is a superposition of states |00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉,
for instance, 1/2(|00〉 + |01〉 + |10〉 + |11〉). n qubits is a superposition of states |00 · · · 0〉, · · · ,
|11 · · · 1〉, i.e., |q〉 =
2n−1∑
x=0
αx |x〉. It’s amazing that n qubits hold information of 2n states at the
same time. This makes quantum computers more powerful than classical computers.
1.1.2 Quantum gates
In classical computers, we use classical logic gates such as AND, NOT, OR, NAND to change
bits’ values. In quantum computers, we use quantum gates to change qubits. Recall that |q〉
denotes state vector |q〉 =
(
α0
α1
)
= α0 |0〉 + α1 |1〉. To transform 2 × 1 column vectors, we will
use 2× 2 matrix. Therefore, we can describe quantum gates in the form of matrices.
Bit flip gate X Bit flip gate X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
. We have X |q〉 =
(
0 1
1 0
)(
α0
α1
)
=
(
α1
α0
)
, i.e., it
transforms |0〉 into |1〉 and |1〉 into |0〉.
Phase flip gate Z Phase flip gate Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. We have Z |q〉 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)(
α0
α1
)
=(
α0
−α1
)
. If we denote |+〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 + |1〉) and |−〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉) then we have Z |+〉 =(
1 0
0 −1
)(
1/
√
2
1/
√
2
)
=
(
1/
√
2
−1/√2
)
= |−〉 and Z |−〉 = |+〉.
The bit flip gate X and phase flip gate Z are basic and boring as they just transform back
and forth between standard states |0〉 ↔ |1〉, |+〉 ↔ |−〉. The following 2 quantum gates are
more interesting.
CNOT (Controlled-NOT) gate
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CNOT (Controlled-NOT) gate: |c〉 |t〉 → |c〉 |c⊕ t〉 where c is the control bit, t is the target
bit. What it means is that if c is 1 then it flips the target bit, otherwise it keeps the target bit
as is. This can be generalized to implement if/else: if c is 1, execute gate U c = U , else don’t
execute U (i.e. execute U c = U0 = I identity).
Hadamard gate H Hadamard transformH = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. We haveH |0〉 = 1/√2(|0〉+|1〉),
H |1〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉). If we apply H
⊗
2 (this notation just means we apply H to 1st and
2nd qubit independently) to 2 qubits |00〉, we have H
⊗
2 |00〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 + |1〉)1/√2(|0〉 +
|1〉) = 1/2(|00〉 + |01〉 + |10〉 + |11〉). Observe that Hadamard gate transforms basis state into
superposition of states, for instance, H transforms |0〉 into superposition of states |0〉, |1〉 and
H
⊗
2 transforms |00〉 into superposition of states |00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉. We have H
⊗
n |00 · · · 0〉 =
1
2n/2
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉, i.e., we can create superposition of all basis states |0...0〉 , · · · , |1...1〉 by applying
H
⊗
n gate to |0...0〉. We’ll use this trick over and over again in designing quantum algorithms.
If we take a closer look at Hadamard gate H |0〉 = 1/√2(|0〉+√2 |1〉), H |1〉 = 1/√2(|0〉−|1〉),
we’ll see that H |u〉 = 1/√2(|0〉+ (−1)u |1〉). Therefore
H
⊗
2 |u1u2〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉+ (−1)u1 |1〉)1/
√
2(|0〉+ (−1)u2 |1〉)
= 1/2(|00〉+ (−1)u2 |01〉+ (−1)u1 |10〉+ (−1)u1u2 |11〉)
= 1/2((−1)(u1,u2).(0,0) |00〉+ (−1)(u1,u2).(0,1) |01〉+ (−1)(u1,u2).(1,0) |10〉+ (−1)(u1,u2).(1,1) |11〉)
= 1/2
∑
x
(−1)u.x |x〉
For n qubits, we have H
⊗
n |u1u2 · · ·un〉 = 12n/2
∑
x(−1)u.x |x〉 where u.x = u1x1 + u2x2 +
· · ·+ unxn is the inner product of u, x.
Unitary transformation If we take a closer look at X, Z, H we see that I = X2 = Z2 = H2.
This is not an accident. For every quantum transformation U , if we denote U∗ as conjugate
transpose of U then UU∗ = U∗U = I. A matrix U satisfying the above equation is called a
unitary matrix. In the above examples, it just happens that X∗ = X, Z∗ = Z, H∗ = H and
hence X2 = XX∗ = I, Z2 = ZZ∗ = I, H2 = HH∗ = I.
1.1.3 Quantum measurement
In classical computers, measurement is a trivial operation because what you see is what you
get. In quantum computers, we never have access to the qubit q’s complex amplitudes α0, α1.
When we measure |q〉 = α0 |0〉 + α1 |1〉, we’ll see |0〉 with probability |α0|2 and see |1〉 with
probability |α1|2. Furthermore, the measured qubit forever collapses to state |0〉 or |1〉, i.e., you
can’t never put the measured qubit back to superposition of states |0〉, |1〉. To a certain extent,
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quantum measurement is a destructive operation. Finally, to make sure that the probabilities of
measurement outcomes summing up to 1, α0 and α1 must satisfy the equation |α0|2 + |α1|2 =
1. This is the reason why you see 1/
√
2 in state like |+〉 = 1/√2 |0〉 + 1/√2 |1〉) because
(1/
√
2)2 + (1/
√
2)2 = 1. For n qubits |q〉 =
2n−1∑
x=0
αx |x〉, we have
2n−1∑
x=0
|αx|2 = 1.
The way quantum measurement works restricts quantum computers’s computation capability.
While n qubits |q〉 =
2n−1∑
x=0
αx |x〉 holds information of 2n basis states at the same time, every
time we measure q, we only observe a tiny bit of information: a specific state |i〉 with probability
|αi|2 and even worst, |q〉 forever collapses to |i〉. In other words, most q’s information is hidden
inside inaccessible αj , j ∈ {0, 1}n. This is the reason why quantum computers is not 2n more
powerful than classical computers.
Partial measurement If we measure 2 qubits like 1/2 |00〉+1/2 |01〉+1/√2 |10〉, we’ll see one
of states |00〉, |01〉, |10〉. What would happen if we only measure the 1st qubit? If the measured
1st qubit is |0〉 then the 2 qubits become 1/√2(|00〉 + |01〉), i.e., superposition of states where
the 1st qubit is |0〉. Note that the amplitudes change from 1/2 to 1/√2 to make sure that the
sum of new states’ probabilities is 1. Similarly, if we measure the 1st qubit and we see |1〉 then
the 2 qubits become |10〉 because among three states |00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 only |10〉 has the 1st qubit
as 1.
1.2 Reversible computation
The fact that any quantum transformation U is unitary has a profound impact on quantum
computation. If we start with quantum state x and we apply quantum computation U to it then
we can always get x back by appling U∗ to U |x〉. The reason is that U∗(U |x〉) = (U∗U) |x〉 =
I |x〉 = |x〉, i.e., all quantum computation is reversible. This contrasts with classical computers
where there are many one way functions.
The question is if we are given a classical function f(x), can we implement it using re-
versible quantum computation? The trick is to carry x to the output as well so that we have
enough information to reverse the computation. There is quantum circuit Uf that implements
Uf |x〉 |b〉 = |x〉 |b⊕ f(x)〉.
1.3 Bernstein-Vazirani’s algorithm
To demonstrate the power of quantum computation, we’ll take a look at Bernstein-Vazirani’s
algorithm [5] that solves parity problems faster than any classical algorithm.
Given a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} as a ”black box” 1 and f(x) = u.x mod 2 for some
hidden u ∈ {0, 1}n, find u.
In classical computers, whenever we query the black box f we only get 1 bit of information
f(x). As u ∈ {0, 1}n has n bits information, we need at least n queries to the black box f to find
n-bit u. Furthermore, if we query f n times using the following x values: 10 · · · 0, 010 · · · 0, · · · ,
00 · · · 1 then we’ll find u because ith query reveals ith bit of u. Therefore, the optimal classical
algorithm requires n queries to f .
In quantum computers, if we denote Uf the quantum circuit that implements f then Bernstein-
Vazirani’s algorithm only uses Uf once. We’ll describe the algorithm by working backwards.
Let’s recall what we’ve learned in the previous sections.
• When we measure n qubits |q〉 =
2n−1∑
i=0
αi |i〉, we’ll see state |i〉 , i ∈ {0, 1}n with probability
|αi|2. In a special case when αu = 1, αi 6=u = 0 or |q〉 = |u〉, measuring |q〉 gives us |u〉.
• H
⊗
n |u〉 = H
⊗
n |u1u2 · · ·un〉 = 12n/2
∑
x(−1)u.x |x〉.
1We can input x to the ”black box” and ask it to compute f(x) , but we don’t have access to its internal
computation process.
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• H2 = I. This implies H
⊗
nH
⊗
n |x〉 = I
⊗
n |x〉 = |x〉.
Based on the above facts, if we can set up quantum state 1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)u.x |x〉 = H
⊗
nu then
applying H
⊗
n to it gives |u〉, so the final quantum measurement results in |u〉. Now, the question
is how to set up the quantum state 1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)u.x |x〉. Note that we don’t know u. However,
we know u.x = f(x), which means that we can rewrite the above state as 1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)f(x) |x〉.
We make progress, but we’re not done yet. Even though we don’t know how to create state
1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)f(x) |x〉 yet, we know how to create the state that looks similar to it using Hadamard
transform H
⊗
n |00 · · · 0〉 = 1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉. The last bit of the puzzle is how to create (−1)f(x).
From ”Reversible computation” section, we have Uf |x〉 |b〉 = |x〉 |b⊕ f(x)〉. Let’s see what
happens to Uf |x〉 |−〉 = 1/
√
2Uf |x〉 (|0〉−|1〉) = 1/
√
2(Uf |x〉 |0〉−Uf |x〉 |1〉) = 1/
√
2(|x〉 |f(x)〉−
|x〉 |1⊕ f(x)〉) = 1/√2 |x〉 (|f(x)〉 − |1⊕ f(x)〉) = 1/√2 |x〉 (−1)f(x)(|0〉 − |1〉) = |x〉 (−1)f(x) |−〉.
Now, we have (−1)f(x).
Putting together in the forward order, we have the algorithm as shown in the above figure:
1. H
⊗
n |00...0〉 gives us 1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉.
2. Applying Uf to
1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉 |−〉 gives us 12(n/2
∑
x(−1)f(x) |x〉 |−〉 = 12n/2
∑
x(−1)u.x |x〉 |−〉
3. Apply H
⊗
n to the first n qubits of 1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)u.x |x〉 |−〉 gives us |u〉 |−〉.
4. Measure the first n qubits of |u〉 |−〉 gives us |u〉.
Now, we solved the problem but it’s not clear why using Uf once gives us n bit information
about u. If we look closer at the 2nd step, even though we use Uf once, we see that the sum
1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)f(x) |x〉 |−〉 have f(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n. How come? The reason is that Uf ’s input
can be a superposition of all basis states
∑
x |x〉 (this is in contrast with classical computers
where the input is only 1 specific |i〉) and so the output contains all f(x), x ∈ {0, 1}n.
1.4 Simon’s algorithm
Given a 2-to-1 function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) for some secret s ∈ {0, 1}n,
find s.
Designing classical algorithms is hard, let alone quantum algorithms. In this problem, the
condition f(x) = f(x ⊕ s) is not even natural, so it’s tough to even start the thinking process
on how to solve the problem. We have no clue. One method that I found helpful is to play with
our existing knowledge, analyze them and/or try to extend them with the hope that somehow
it will lead us closer to the solution.
In the previous section, we’ve seen how to access all f(x), x ∈ {0, 1}n using H
⊗
n, followed
by Uf . Recall that H
⊗
n gives us 1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉 and applying Uf to 12n/2
∑
x |x〉 |00...0〉 gives us
1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉 |f(x)〉. Note that 12n/2
∑
x |x〉 |f(x)〉 are 2n qubits as f(x) is n-bit.
If we measure the 1st n qubits of 1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉 |f(x)〉 and the 1st n qubits collapses to |r〉 for
some r, then the 2n qubits collapses to |r〉 |f(r)〉. We’ve made progress as we’ve just learned
that this path leads nowhere :)
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If we measure the 2nd n qubits of 1
2n/2
∑
x |x〉 |f(x)〉 and we see |f(r)〉 for some r then
the 2n qubit collapses to |r〉 |f(r)〉. Wait a second, this wasn’t correct. From the problem
statement, we know |f(r)〉 = |f(r ⊕ s)〉, i.e., if we see |f(r)〉, then we see |f(r ⊕ s)〉 as well because
they both equal each other. In other words, the 2n qubits state collapses to 1/
√
2(|r〉 |f(r)〉 +
|r ⊕ s〉 |f(r ⊕ s)〉) = 1/√2((|r〉 + |r ⊕ s〉) |f(r)〉). This is pretty cool as we’ve discovered a new
state 1/
√
2(|r〉+ |r ⊕ s〉) that we’ve never seen before.
What are we going to do with 1/
√
2(|r〉+ |r ⊕ s〉)? This is a specific state for some random
r, so let’s apply H
⊗
n to make it in superposition of all basis states again. Are you sick of
H
⊗
n yet? :) I’m sorry that I have to make you real sick because we’ll continue using H
⊗
n
over and over again. Applying H
⊗
n to |r〉 gives us 1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)r.x |x〉 while applying H
⊗
n to
|r ⊕ s〉 gives us 1
2n/2
∑
x(−1)(r⊕s).x |x〉, therefore applying H
⊗
n to 1/
√
2(|r〉+ |r ⊕ s〉) gives us
1
2(n+1)/2
∑
x((−1)r.x + (−1)(r⊕s).x) |x〉. The value (−1)r.x + (−1)r.x⊕s.x is pretty special because
if s.x = 1 mod 2 then (−1)r.x + (−1)r.x⊕1 = (−1)r.x(1 + (−1)) = 0 (i.e. we never see the
corresponding |x〉), otherwise if s.x = 0 then (−1)r.x + (−1)r.x⊕0 = 2(−1)r.x 6= 0. What it
means is after measurement, we only see |x〉 such that s.x = 0 for some random x. The complete
Simon algorithm [6] is shown in the below figure
All right, we get s.x = 0 for some random x. This isn’t enough to solve for s. What we can
do is to repeat the algorithm so that we will receive a system of linear equations where each
equation has the form s.x = 0 with probably different random x. Roughly we need n equations
of the form s.x = 0 to find s using Gauss elimination algorithm.
1.5 Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT)
Denote ω N-rooth of unity: ωN = 1. Classical Fourier transform is defined by the following
matrix:
FN = 1/
√
N

1 1 1 · · · 1
1 ω ω2 · · · ωN−1
1 ω2 ω4 · · · ω2(N−1)
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 ωN−1 ω2(N−1) · · · ω(N−1)2

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Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) is simply applying the same matrix to a quantum state:
FN

α0
α1
...
αN−1
 =

β0
β1
...
βN−1
 or FN (∑j αj |j〉) = ∑k βk |k〉. In a special case, when α0 = 1 and
αi = 0, i 6= 0 we have FN |0〉 = 1/
√
N
∑
k |k〉, i.e., it transform |0〉 into superposition of all basis
states. Did you notice that it looks similar to Hadamard transform H
⊗
n? The reason is that
in fact, Hamamard transform is a special case of QFT.
I don’t know about you but FN looks scary as hell to me :) Fourier transform is beyond my
depth, let alone QFT. However, QFT plays an important role in Shor’s algorithms, so we have
to study it. One method to get away from dealing with deep math is to learn its properties
without proving them. We can dig deeper into the proof once our math muscle is stronger. For
now, let’s see QFT’s nice properties.
Efficient implementation QFT can be implemented in O((logN)2). In other words, QFT
can be efficiently implemented in polynomial time of N’s bit length.
Shift property FN

αN−1
α0
α1
...
αN−2
 =

1β0
ωβ1
ω2β2
...
ωN−1βN−1
 or FN (αN1 |0〉+α0 |1〉+α1 |2〉+· · ·+αN−2 |N − 1〉 =
∑
k ω
kβk |k〉, i.e., when we move the 1st amplitude α0 to the 2nd position, the 2nd amplitude α1
to the 3rd position, etc then applying QFT to the result corresponds to multiplying βk with ω
k.
When we measure
∑
k ω
kβk |k〉, we’ll see specific state |k〉 with probability |ωkβk|2 = |ωk|2|βk|2.
As the magnitude of ωk is 1, we’ll see specific state |k〉 with probability |βk|2. This is exactly
the same as if we measure
∑
k βk |k〉. What it means is that if we shift the input αi, it doesn’t
change the measurement of the QFT’s output.
Periodic property If f(x) is a periodic function with period r (i.e., f(x) = f(x+r mod N))
then FNf(x) is a periodic function with period N/r. Let’s consider a special case f(x) =
1/
√
N/r
∑N/r−1
j=0 |jr〉, i.e., the amplitudes are 1/
√
N/r at 0, r, 2r, · · · , (N/r − 1)r and are zeros
everywhere else, hence f(x) is a period function with period r. In this special case, FN (1/
√
N/r
∑N/r−1
j=0 |jr〉) =
1/
√
r
∑r−1
l=0 |lN/r〉. Note that the right hand side’s amplitudes are 1/
√
r at 0, N/r, 2(N/r), · · · ,
(r − 1)(N/r) and are zeros everywhere else and hence it’s a period function with period N/r.
1.6 Period finding
Assume f : {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} → S (S is just some set) is a periodic function with hidden period
r (r|N): f(x) = f(x+ r( mod N)). Find r.
The algorithm is shown in the left figure.
I guess you’re disappointed with me because I didn’t explain the thinking process in designing
the solution, instead I jumped directly to the final algorithm as shown above. The reason is that
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if you look back Simon’s algorithm (as shown in the right figure), you’ll notice that it looks
exactly the same as period finding’s algorithm, except we replace H
⊗
n in Simon’s algorithm
with QFTN in period finding algorithm. Surprise!
The function f in period finding problem is different from Simon’s algorithm and QFTN is
similar but different from H
⊗
n. Therefore, we have to analyze the period finding algorithm
closely.
After applying QFTN to |0〉, we get 1/
√
N
∑
x |x〉. After Uf , we have 1/
√
N
∑
x |x〉 |f(x)〉.
If we measure |f(x)〉 and get f(k) for some specific k then as f(k) = f(k + r) = · · · = f(k +
r(N/r − 1)), we know that 1/√N∑x |x〉 |f(x)〉 collapses to |k〉 |f(k)〉+ |k + r〉 |f(k + r)〉 + · · ·
+ |k + r(N/r − 1)〉 |f(k + r(N/r − 1))〉. Rewrite the result as ∑N/r−1j=0 |jr + k〉 |f(k)〉. However,
as shifting doesn’t affect QFT’s measurement, we can simplify the 1st n qubits to
∑N/r−1
j=0 |jr〉.
Now, using period property of QFT, we know that the last QFTN will transform
∑N/r−1
j=0 |jr〉
into
∑r−1
l=0 |lN/r〉. After measuring the 1st n qubits, we’ll get sN/r for some random s.
If we repeat the above algorithm a few times, we get s1N/r, s2N/r, s3N/r, etc. It’s easy to
see that the greatest common divisor of them gives us N/r or r.
1.7 Shor’s algorithms
In the previous section, we have built a general framework to find the period of an arbitrary
periodic function. In this section, we’ll describe Shor’s algorithms [3] by transforming factoring
problems and discrete log problems into period finding problems.
1.7.1 Shor’s factoring algorithm
Given n = p1 ∗ p2 where p1, p2 are prime numbers, find p1, p2.
Shor’s algorithm is based on the following classical observation. For a random number x, if
we can find an even number r such that xr = 1 mod n then gcd(xr/2 − 1, n) or gcd(xr/2 + 1, n)
gives us the factor of n. Let’s see why. xr − 1 = (xr/2 − 1)(xr/2 + 1) = 0 mod n implies
(xr/2 − 1)(xr/2 + 1) = 0 mod p1, i.e., p1 divides either (xr/2 − 1) or (xr/2 + 1). In other words,
p1 divides gcd(x
r/2 − 1, n) or gcd(xr/2 + 1, n).
What does xr = 1 mod n mean? It means that if we fix the random number x and define
f(a) = xa mod n then f(a + r) = xa+r = xaxr = xa ∗ 1 = f(a) mod n, i.e., f(a) is a
periodic function with period r. Therefore, the algorithm is to generate random x, use the period
finding algorithm to find period r of f(a) = xa mod n and finally compute gcd(xr/2 − 1, n) or
gcd(xr/2 + 1, n). What if we find odd r, instead of even r? We just repeat the algorithm with a
different x.
1.7.2 Shor’s discrete algorithm
Assuming p is a prime number and g is the generator of multiplicative group mod p, i.e., the
set {g0, g1, · · · , gp−2} is the same as {1, 2, · · · , p− 1}. Given y = gx mod p, find x.
Let’s take a look at the function f(a, b) = gay−b mod p, we have f(a + rx, b + r) =
ga+rxy−b−r = ga+rx(gx)−b−r = ga+rx−xb−rx = ga−xb = f(a, b) mod p. I.e., f(a, b) is a pe-
riodic function with tuple period (rx, r). Using a period finding algorithm to find the period
(r1, r2) of f(a, b) and compute discrete log x = r1/r2.
2 Lattice-based cryptography
Lattice [7], [8] is a rare double-edged sword in cryptography. It can be used to build cryptographic
protocols as well as to break them. Furthermore, lattice-based cryptography is assumed to be safe
against quantum computers, while ECDH key exchange and RSA aren’t. As quantum computers
are more powerful than classical computers, can we deduce that lattice-based cryptography is
safe against classical computers? No, we can’t. It’s because we start with a security assumption
9
(not fact) which might turn out to be wrong. Like many other things in cryptography, lattice-
based cryptography’s security is an assumption, no one knows for sure. There is no evidence
that lattice-based cryptography is safer than ECDH against classical computers. Therefore,
it’s better to deploy lattice-based key exchange in hybrid mode together with ECDH where
the shared key is derived from both lattice and ECDH. Finally, lattice-based cryptography has
extraordinary properties that no other cryptographic constructions have. It is used to build
famous fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).2
Lattice-based cryptography often relies on the hardness of finding something small or solving
equations with errors. Every time you see the words small and errors in the context of vectors,
equations, polynomials, you know that you land in the realms of lattice-based cryptography.
Before studying lattice, let’s warm up by solving Fermat’s last equation xn + yn = zn. I
found a beautiful solution z = n
√
xn + yn. Sorry, I forgot that x, y, z must be integers :) All
right, I found an integer solution as well x = 0, z = y :) What’s wrong with me! I missed the
conditions x, y, z > 0. The lessons learned are to pay attention to both the variables’ domains
and their constraints.
2.1 Lattice definitions
Definition Lattice 3 is a set of points L = {
i=n∑
i=1
aivi|ai ∈ Z} where vi are linearly independent
vectors in Rn and B = {v1, · · · , vn} is a base of L. We often write vi in the form of n×1 column
vector and B = (v1, · · · , vn) is a n× n matrix.
To understand this abstract definition, let’s take a look at a concrete example where v1 =
(2, 0), v2 = (0, 2), i.e., v1 and v2 are twice unit vectors in x-axis and y-axis. The lattice L is the
set of points {a1v1 + a2v2 = (2a1, 2a2)|a1, a2 ∈ Z}, i.e., all even integer points in 2-dimensional
space. This gives us a figure of lattice, but we haven’t gone far in understanding the definition.
One way to move forward is to question the details of the definition.
What if {v1, · · · , vn} are dependent vectors, e.g., v1 = v2 = (0, 2)? In this case, a single vector
v1 is enough to generate L, i.e., the linearly independent condition is to remove redundancy in
{v1, · · · , vn}.
What if ai are real numbers, instead of integers? In this case, L is the whole 2-dimensional
space regardless of the base B = {v1, v2} , i.e., L loses all its interesting math structure.
If we change {v1, · · · , vn}, will L change? Not always. L is defined as a set of points, i.e.,
the points are the essence of L, not vectors {v1, · · · , vn} that are used to generate L. The
vectors {v′1 = (2, 0), v′2 = (2, 2)} (v′1 = v1, v′2 = v1 + v2) also generate all even integer points in
2-dimensional space, i.e., the base B = {v1, · · · , vn} of L is not unique. In fact, if U is an integer
matrix with determinant ±1 then B′ = BU is another base of L. In our example, U =
(
1 1
0 1
)
,
det(U) = 1 and (v′1, v
′
2) = (v1, v1 + v2) = (v1, v2)
(
1 1
0 1
)
.
We’ve made significant progress but we can go further by playing with the elements in the
definition. If ai = 0 then 0 = 0v1 + · · · + 0vn is in L. If x = a1v1 + · · · anvn is in L then
−x = (−a1)v1 + · · ·+ (−an)vn is in L. If x = a1v1 + · · ·+ anvn and x′ = a′1v1 + · · ·+ a′nvn are
in L then x+ x′ = (a1 + a′1)v1 + · · ·+ (an + a′n)vn is also in L. The above properties make L an
additive subgroup of Rn. The question is whether any additive subgroup of Rn a lattice? When
showing the above properties we haven’t used the fact that ai are integers at all. As mentioned
above if ai are real numbers then L contains all points in 2-dimensional space and the fact that
ai are integers make the lattice look discrete and not dense. Put everything together, we have
an equivalent definition of lattice.
Definition Lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn.
2I copied some paragraphs from my previous article [9] because I’m lazy :)
3Lattice has a deep theory which is out of my depth. If you want to understand lattice in depth, I recommend
studying it by excellent formal sources [7], [8].
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You may wonder why I made an effort to introduce the 2nd definition. What’s the point? In
practical problems, no one is going to tell us that there is a lattice structure. We ourselves have
to recognize the lattice structure hidden in the problem we’re trying to solve. The 1st definition
is not useful in this regard because we’re not even sure yet there is a lattice, let alone know its
basis vectors. The 2nd definition gives us signals to detect hidden lattice structure.
Let’s look at the set of integer solutions of the following equation 2x1 + 3x2 = 0. It’s obvious
that (0, 0) is a solution. If (x1, x2) and (x
′
1, x
′
2) are solutions then (−x1,−x2) and (x1+x′1, x2+x′2)
are solutions because 2(−x1) + 3(−x2) = −(2x1 + 3x2) = 0 and 2(x1 + x′1) + 3(x2 + x′2) =
(2x1 + 3x2) + (2x
′
1 + 3x
′
2) = 0 + 0 = 0. The above properties make the set of solutions additive
subgroup of Rn and the integer condition makes it discrete. Therefore, the set of solutions is
a lattice. In conclusion, we know that the set of solutions forms a lattice without solving the
equation, is it amazing? While this example is somewhat trivial, we’ll use this observation in
more complicated problems in later sections.
2.1.1 Successive minima
We briefly introduce a few concepts that we’ll need in later sections.
λ1(L) denotes the length of a nonzero shortest vector in L. As 0 is always in L, in the
definition of λ1(L), we have to add the nonzero condition to avoid trivial cases.
The ith successive minima λi(L) is the smallest r such that L has i linearly independent
vectors whose lengths are at most r.
2.2 Hard lattice computational problems
Public-key cryptography is based on hard computational problems. For instance, ECDH is based
on hardness of discrete log problems while RSA is based on hardness of factoring problems. Sim-
ilarly, lattice-based cryptography is based on hard lattice computational problems. Therefore,
we briefly introduce the following hard lattice computational problems, mostly to introduce the
terminologies.
Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVPγ): Given lattice L(B) and small γ > 0, find n
linearly independent lattice vectors whose length is at most γλn(L).
Bounded Distance Decoding Problems (BDDγ): Given a lattice L(B), small γ > 0 and a
target point t that is guaranteed to be close to L (i.e. distance(t, L) < d = λ1(L)/γ), find a
unique lattice vector v such that ||v − t|| < d.
For the purpose of this article, it’s fine to just remember the following: for lattice, it’s difficult
to find short lattice vectors or to find a lattice vector close to a given target point.
2.3 Short Integer Solution (SIS)
SIS Problem Given m random vector ai ∈ Znq (i.e. ai is a n-dimensional vector where each
coordinate is integer mod q), find nonzero solution (z1, · · · , zm) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} of system of linear
equations z1a1 + · · · + zmam = 0. In matrix form Az = 0 where A = (a1, · · · , am) is a n ×m
matrix.
Note that if there is no condition zi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} then we know how to solve this system of
linear equations using Gaussian elimination.
Let’s take a look at the set of solutions {(z1, · · · , zm)}. (0, · · · , 0) is a trivial solution. If
(z1, · · · , zm) and (z′1, · · · , z′m) are solutions then (−z1, · · · ,−zm) and (z1 + z′1, · · · , zm + z′m) are
solutions because (−z1)a1+· · ·+(−zm)am = −(z1a1+· · ·+zmam) = 0 and (z1+z′1)a1+· · ·+(zm+
z′m)am = (z1a1 + · · · + zmam) + (z′1a1 + · · · + z′mam) = 0 + 0 = 0. The above properties make
the set of solutions {(z1, · · · , zm} an additive group and integer condition makes it discrete.
Therefore, the set of integer solutions {(z1, · · · , zm)} is a lattice. How’s about the condition
zi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}? This condition forces the vector (z1, · · · , zm) to be small. Consequently, solving
SIS problems is similar to finding small vectors in the lattice of integer solutions. In other words,
solving SIS is a hard problem. It’s pretty cool as whenever we see a hard problem, we have hope
to use it to build cryptographic protocols. In the next section, we’ll use the hardness of SIS
problem to construct collision-resistant hash function.
11
2.3.1 Collision-resistant hash functions based on SIS
Given a random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , the function fA(z) = Az where z ∈ {0, 1}m is a collision-
resistant hash function.
We’ll use proof by contradiction. If fA(z) = Az is not a collision-resistant hash function
then we can find z1, z2 ∈ {0, 1}m such that fA(z1) = fA(z2). This implies Az1 = Az2 or
A(z1 − z2) = 0. As z1, z2 ∈ {0, 1}m, we have z1 − z2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m. It means that we found
z = z1 − z2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m such that Az = 0. In other words, we can solve SIS problems
(contradicts the fact that SIS problems are hard).
2.4 Learning With Errors (LWE)
Who came up with the name ”learning with errors”[10]? Learning with accurate information is
hard, let alone learning with misinformation and errors :) Maybe, it’s the intention to make the
attacker’s life miserable.
LWE Problem Generate m random vectors ai ∈ Znq , small random errors ei, a random secret
s ∈ Znq and computes bi = 〈ai, s〉+ ei mod q ∈ Zq 4. Given (ai, bi) , find s.
In the matrix form, given (A, bt = stA+ et mod q) 5, find s where A = (a1 · · · am) is an n×m
matrix and b = (b1 · · · bm) ∈ Zmq . A closely related problem is to not find s, but to distinguish
(A, bt = stA+ et mod q) from random distribution.
Note that if there are no errors ei then b
t = stA is a system of linear equations which we
know how to solve for s using Gaussian elimination.
Now, let’s try to find our lattice in this LWE problem. If we remove errors ei then if we
fix matrix A, the set L = {stA mod q} forms a lattice. Why? 0 = 0A is in L. If x1 = st1A
and x2 = s
t
2A are in L then −x1 and x1 + x2 are in L because −x1 = −st1A = (−st1)A and
x1 +x2 = s
t
1A+ s
t
2A = (s
t
1 + s
t
2)A. The above properties make L additive group and the integer
condition makes it discrete. Therefore, L is a lattice. In our LWE problem, bt = stA + et is a
point close to the lattice point stA because the difference between them is the small error vector
et. Our task is given bt, find the lattice point stA close to it (note that knowing stA is enough to
find st using Gaussian elimination). This is the Bounded Distance Decoding (BDDγ) problem
which is hard to solve.
2.4.1 Ring-LWE
Define R = Zq[x]/(x
n+1) where n is a power of 2, i.e., polynomials of degree n where coefficients
are integers mod q and operations on polynomials are mod xn + 1 (i.e. we can replace xn
with -1). The definition of Ring-LWE is similar to LWE, except instead of using Znq , we use R.
Ring-LWE Problem Generate m random polynomials ai ∈ R, small random error polyno-
mials ei, a random secret s ∈ R, computes bi = ais+ ei. Given (ai, bi), find s.
What’s the relationship between element of R with our familiar vector Znq ? Let’s write down
a polynomial p(x) in R
p(x) = an−1xn−1 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0
The coefficients (an−1, · · · , a1, a0) is a vector in Znq . One one hand, to a certain extent, we
can cast Ring-LWE problems into LWE problems. On the other hand, polynomial mod (xn+1)
4The notation 〈x, y〉 denotes the inner product of 2 vectors x = (x1, · · · , xn), y = (y1, · · · , yn), i.e., x1y1 +
· · ·+ xnyn
5The notation st means the transpose of s
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has more structure than Znq . Let’s briefly take a look at p(x)x mod x
n + 1
p(x)x = (an−1xn−1 + an−2xn−2 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0)x
= an−1xn + an−2xn−1 + · · ·+ a1x2 + a0x
= an−1(−1) + an−2xn−1 + · · ·+ a1x2 + a0x
= an−2xn−1 + · · ·+ a1x2 + a0x− an−1
I.e. multiply p(x) with x corresponds to transform from (an−1, · · · , a1, a0) to (an−2, · · · , a1, a0,−an−1).
Properties like this make implementation of Ring-LWE more efficient than LWE. However, when-
ever you have extra math structure, it might later come back and help cryptanalysis. There is an
on-going debate about the trade-off between efficiency of Ring-LWE and its extra math structure
to security.
2.5 Regev’s LWE public key cryptosystem
In this section, we’ll take a look at Regev’s public key cryptosystem [10] that is based on the
hardness of LWE problem. The protocol only encrypts a single bit µ but it can be generalized
to encrypt arbitrary data. Note that Regev’s encryption is only semantically secure, i.e., the
ciphertext is indistinguishable from random distribution and it’s safe against eavesdropper. It’s
not safe against active adversary, i.e., it’s not safe against chosen ciphertext attack.
To build any public key cryptosystem, the first step is to construct private/public key pair.
LWE’s description gives us a hint on how to do it: Alice’s private key is s and her public key
is (A, bt = stA + et). As (A, bt = stA + et) is indistinguishable from random distribution, the
public key (A, bt) doesn’t leak any information about the private key s. The question is how to
use the public key (A, bt) for encryption?
As semantic security concerns indistinguishability from random, we’ll try to generate ran-
dom alike traffic to confuse eavesdroppers. We need another math property: if x ∈ {0, 1}m
then (A,Ax) is indistinguishable from random distribution. Therefore, using Alice’s public key
(A, bt = stA + et), Bob can generate x ∈ {0, 1}m and send (Ax, btx) to Alice. This is safe
because (Ax, btx) is indistinguishable from random distribution. What can Alice do? Note
that btx = (stA + et)x = stAx + etx and Alice knows the private key st, so she can compute
btx− stAx = etx. I.e., Alice can compute the noise etx (et and x are small), but the eavesdrop-
per can’t. Awesome, Bob can generate random-alike traffic (Ax, btx) and Alice can denoise it.
We’re happy, we make the eavesdropper confused, except we confuse ourselves as well because
we haven’t encrypted anything yet :)
We’re close to the final protocol. The last piece of the puzzle is how to include the bit µ into
the traffic. What will happen if Bob sends (Ax, btx + µ)? Alice uses the same computation to
get btx − stAx = etx + µ. However, Alice doesn’t know x, so while she can compute the noise
etx+ µ, she can’t extract µ from it. The idea to solve this puzzle is to encode the ”meaning” of
µ, instead of µ itself into the traffic: if µ = 0, we doesn’t include it into the traffic, but if µ = 1
then we include large number µbq
2
e into traffic. When Alice receives it, she computes btx−stAx
and if the result is small, she knows that µ was 0, otherwise if btx − stAx is large, she knows
that µ was 1. The complete protocol is shown in the below figure.
Alice Bob
Secret s←$Znq x←$ {0, 1}m
bt = stA+ et (A, b
t)
u = Ax
u′ = btx+ µb q
2
e
(u, u′)
u′ − stu ≈ µb q
2
e
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To encrypt a bit µ, choose random x ∈ {0, 1}m, compute ciphertext as follow (u = Ax, u′ =
btx+ µbq
2
e).
To decrypt, compute u′−stu = btx+µbq
2
e−stAx = (stA+et)x+µbq
2
e−stAx = etx+µbq
2
e ≈
µbq
2
e and test whether it is closer to 0 (µ = 0 case) or bq
2
e mod q (µ = 1 case).
2.6 Lattice cryptanalysis of subset sum problem
LLL algorithm [11] is a celebrated algorithm, there is a dedicated book just for LLL algorithm
and its applications. For the purpose of the article, we’ll use only one property of the LLL
algorithm. Given a lattice L(B) in Rn where B is a base of L, LLL algorithm will find a
relatively short vector b: ||b|| < βnλ1(L) where 1 < β < 2.
Using the above property, to solve certain equations, we’ll prove the following:
• The solutions belong to a lattice.
• The solutions are short vectors.
After that we’ll let LLL algorithm do its job to find short vectors (solutions) in the above
lattice for us. Let’s apply the described method to solve the following subset sum problem [12]:
given n positive numbers ai and a positive number M , find xi ∈ {0, 1} such that a1x1 + · · · +
anxn = M .
Let’s consider the following vectors
b1 = (1, 0, · · · , 0,−a1)
b2 = (0, 1, · · · , 0,−a2)
...
bn = (0, 0, · · · , 1,−an)
bn+1 = (0, 0, · · · , 0,M)
We have
x1b1 + x2b2 + · · ·+ xnbn + 1bn+1
= (x1, 0, · · · , 0,−a1x1)
+ (0, x2, · · · , 0,−a2x2)
...
+ (0, 0, · · · , xn,−anxn)
+ (0, 0, · · · , 0,M)
= (x1, x2, · · · , xn,−a1x1 − a2x2 + · · · − anxn +M)
= (x1, x2, · · · , xn, 0)
I.e., (x1, x2, · · · , xn, 0) is a vector in the lattice with basis vectors b1, · · · , bn+1. Furthermore,
(x1, x2, · · · , xn, 0) is a short vector because xi ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, LLL algorithm will help find
the short vector (solution) (x1, x2, · · · , xn, 0) for us.
2.7 Lattice-based homomorphic encryption
Let’s assume we have data that we store in a cloud. To protect our data, we encrypt them and
keep the key to ourselves. On the other hand, we want to take advantage of cloud’s computing
power, so we want the cloud to compute on our ciphertexts without knowing what our plaintexts
are. Homomorphic encryption is a special type of encryption that achieves the previous goal. In
this section, we’ll describe a simple lattice-based homomorphic encryption [13].
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We’ll use Zq[x]/(x2
k
+ 1) (q is a prime number), i.e., polynomials whose coefficients are in Zq
and all operations are mod x2
k
+1. We also use a small modulus t that is much smaller than q.
Note that everything in this section including secret key, message, ciphertext are polynomials.
The secret key is a polynomial s in Zq[x]/(x2
k
+ 1).
To encrypt a message polynomial m ∈ Zt[x]/(x2k + 1) , we randomly generate polynomial a,
small error polynomial e and the ciphertext is simply c = Enc(m) = (c0, c1) = (−a, as+m+et).
To decrypt a ciphertext c = (c0, c1), we compute c1 + c0s mod t = as + m + et − as
mod t = m+ et mod t = m.
To see how this encryption is additive homomorphic, let’s take a look at two encryptions
of m and m′: c = Enc(m) = (c0, c1) = (−a, as + m + et) and c′ = Enc(m′) = (c′0, c′1) =
(−a′, a′s+m′ + e′t). If we add (c0, c1) and (c′0, c′1) together, we have:
(c0, c1) + (c
′
0, c
′
1) = (c0 + c
′
0, c1 + c
′
1)
= (−a− a′, as+m+ et+ a′s+m′ + e′t)
= (−(a+ a′), (a+ a′)s+ (m+m′) + (e+ e′)t
If we denote a′′ = a + a′, m′′ = m + m′, e′′ = e + e′, then we see that c′′ = (c′′0 , c
′′
1) =
(c0, c1) + (c
′
0, c
′
1) is the encryption of m
′′ = m+m′ with error e′′ = e+ e′. To recap, what we’ve
done is to add 2 ciphertexts together without knowing the messages, but the result corresponds
to the sum of the messages. It’s pretty cool, right?
Another nice property is that if you multiply a polynomial p to the encryption of m then the
result corresponds to encryption of pm. To see why it’s the case, let’s take a look at polynomial
p and encryption of m: (c0, c1) = (−a, as+m+ et). We have:
p(c0, c1) = (pc0, pc1)
= (p(−a), p(as+m+ et))
= (−pa, pas+ pm+ pet)
If we denote a′ = −pa, m′ = pm, e′ = pe, then we see that (c′0, c′1) = p(c0, c1) is the
encryption of m′ = pm with error e′ = pe.
The final note is that the error increases in both cases. For lattice-based cryptography to
work, the error must be small. Therefore, various techniques have been designed to reduce the
error over time. We won’t discuss error reduction techniques here, instead, we’ll take a look at
an awesome application of the previous homomorphic encryption in the next section.
2.8 Lattice-based private information retrieval
Let’s say a server has a public database (e.g. movies, songs, lyrics, stories, books) with n items
x1, · · · , xn. A user wants to see a single item xi at index i from the database without revealing
to the server what item has been downloaded. This is to protect the user’s privacy. An obvious
solution is the user downloads all n items from the database. This has perfect privacy, but
it costs significant bandwidth and user’s local storage. We’ll trade CPU with bandwidth and
storage using the above homomorphic encryption [14]. The basic protocol works as follows.
The user forms a sequence of 0 and 1 where only at index i, it’s 1 while the remaining numbers
are 0: 0, · · · , 0, 1︸︷︷︸
index i
, 0, · · · , 0. The user uses homomorphic encryption to encrypt the above
sequence, i.e., c1 = Enc(0), · · · , ci−1 = Enc(0), ci = Enc(1), ci+1 = Enc(0), · · · , cn = Enc(0).
The user sends c1, · · · , cn to the server.
The server computes x = x1c1 + · · · + xncn without knowing what i is and sends x to the
user.
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The user decrypts x and the result is xi. Why’s that? By homomorphic property, x =
x1c1+ · · ·+xncn corresponds to the encryption of x1.0+ · · ·+xi−1.0+xi.1+xi+1.0+ · · ·+xn.1 =
0 + · · ·+ 0 + xi + 0 + · · ·+ 0 = xi.
3 Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman(SIDH)
SIDH [15][16][17][18] is the hardest to understand post-quantum cryptography construction. If
you read my previous article ”Intuitive Advanced Cryptography” [9], you would know that
ECDH uses 1 elliptic curve, then pairing increases the difficulty significantly by using 2 elliptic
curves. SIDH is the next difficulty level where it uses a graph (set) of elliptic curves. Therefore,
this chapter requires prerequisite: you must watch the movie Inception by Christopher Nolan.
I’m serious! Furthermore, we’ll give up on the ambitious goal of analyzing SIDH’s security.
Instead, we’ll set a humble (not-so-humble) goal to understand how SIDH works. If we can’t
achieve our goal, change it to an easier one :)
Alice Bob
A = aG A
B B = bG
aB = a(bG) = abG bA = b(aG) = baG
Let’s recall a few terminologies in elliptic curve and ECDH protocol. In this article, we’ll use
supersingular 6 elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fq = Fp2 . An extraordinary property
of elliptic curve is that we can define addition operation + between its points, i.e., given 2 points
P,Q ∈ E, the operation P +Q makes sense and the result is another point R ∈ E. How points
addition operation + is defined is not our concern, what we care is that (E,+) forms a group.
The order of a point P is the smallest number n for which nG = 0 where 0 denotes the identity
of E. The ECDH protocol works as follows. Alice generates a random private key a, computes
her public key A = aG and sends A to Bob. Bob generates a random private key b, computes
his public key B = bG and sends B to Alice. Now Alice computes aB = a(bG) = abG and Bob
computes bA = b(aG) = baG. We notice that Alice and Bob compute the same result abG and
it’s their shared key that can be used for encryption.
Let’s look at ECDH from a different perspective using graph terminology. Let consider
points in the elliptic curve E as nodes in a graph and 2 points are connected by an edge if their
difference is G. Using graph terminology, Alice computes her public key aG by travelling through
the following path in the graph: P1 = G
G−→ P2 = 2G G−→ P3 = 3G · · · G−→ Pa = aG. The security
relies on the fact that knowing the destination point Pa = aG doesn’t help the adversary compute
how many edges
G−→ that Alice has gone through. In terms of practical computation, Alice does
not compute Pa = aG linearly as shown above, instead she uses a double-and-add algorithm. In
special case when a = 2k, Alice computes P1 = G,P2 = 2P1, P4 = 2P2, · · · , P2k = 2P2k−1 . In
other words, in ECDH protocol, each node is a point and we travel from points to points within
1 elliptic curve. In SIDH protocol, a node is an elliptic curve 7 and we travel from elliptic curves
to elliptic curves and if we look inside 1 node/elliptic curve we’ll see multiple points inside it.
It’s similar to dreams in the movie Inception. Inside each node (elliptic curve) in SIDH protocol,
there are other nodes (points) within that elliptic curve. From another perspective, it’s similar
to abstraction layers. At the SIDH layer, each node in a graph is an elliptic curve and we
6Let’s ignore what supersingular means. For advanced readers, the word supersingular probably triggers your
negative reaction because using supersingular curves in ECDH is not safe. However, SIDH uses a graph of elliptic
curves, not points within 1 elliptic curve like ECDH, so the computational hard problem is different.
7For strict readers, a node is a set of isomorphic elliptic curves that have the same j-invariants.
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abstract away the detail in the lower layer of how points within that elliptic curve look like. We
talked about nodes, but we haven’t defined edges in SIDH protocol. I.e. what connects 1 node
(1 elliptic curve) to another?
The connection from 1 node (1 elliptic curve) to another in SIDH protocol is an isogeny.
Formally, isogeny is a non-constant rational map E1
φ−→ E2 which is also a group homomorphism
from E1(Fq) to E2(Fq). What rational map means is not our concern but we’ll pay attention to
what group homomorphism is. In this context, group homomorphism means that φ(αP +βQ) =
αφ(P ) + βφ(Q) where P,Q ∈ E1, α, β ∈ Z. I.e., if we’re given φ(P ), φ(Q) then we can compute
φ of any linear combination αP +βQ of P and Q. In the next paragraphs, we’ll introduce a few
new concepts and isogeny’s properties.
The kernel of E1
φ−→ E2 is the set of points P ∈ E1 such as φ(P ) = 0.
The degree of isogeny E1
φ−→ E2, denoted as degφ, is the number of elements in the kernel
ker(φ).
The multiplication-by-n map E
[n]−−→ E maps a point P to nP . The n-torsion group of E,
denoted E[n] is the set of all points P ∈ E such that nP is the identity. In other words, n-torsion
group is the kernel of a multiplication-by-n map.
The composition of isogenies E0
φ0−→ E1 and E1 φ1−→ E2 is an isogeny φ1 ◦ φ0 : E0 → E2
(E0
φ0−→ E1 φ1−→ E2) and deg(φ1 ◦ φ0) = degφ1 ∗ degφ0. This composition property is important
as it allows us to combine edges to create paths such as E0
φ0−→ E1 φ1−→ E2. Let’s look at a path
with more than 2 edges. If we have a series of k edges (isogenies), each have degree 2 as follows:
E0
φ0−→ E1 φ1−→ E2 φ2−→ E3 · · · φk−1−−−→ Ek then the composition φk−1 ◦ φk−2 · · ·φ0 : E0 → Ek has
order 2k. Do you notice the similarity with ECDH?
ECDH: P1 = G P2 = 2P1 P4 = 2P2 · · · P2k = 2P2k−1
SIDH: E1 = φ0(E0) E2 = φ1(E1) E3 = φ2(E2) · · · Ek = φk−1(Ek−1)
The previous paragraph assumes that we know how to construct isogeny φi. It’s time to
discuss isogeny’s construction. Given a finite subgroup G ∈ E1, Ve´lu formula 8 constructs an
isogeny φ : E1 → E2 that has G as kernel and we write E2 = φ(E1) = E1/〈G〉. What it means
is that if we start at E1, choose a subgroup G as kernel, then we not only can construct an edge
(isogeny) from E1 but we also know how to compute the other end E2 of the constructed edge.
In other words, an edge (isogeny) is determined by its kernel (subgroup of starting node). We’ll
come back to this property in later paragraphs.
We’re not ready to describe the protocol yet. The elliptic curves in SIDH have special
structure, so we have to look at them first. We will work with extension field Fq = Fp2 where
p is a prime of the form p = leAA l
eB
B − 1, lA = 2, lB = 3. Fix a supersingular curve E0 over Fq.
We have E0[2
eA ] ∼= Z2eA ×Z2eA . In layman’s term, it means that there exist 2 points PA, QA of
order 2eA and they’re the basis of 2eA -torsion group of E0 (aka kernel of multiplication-by-2
eA
map). We write E0[2
eA ] = 〈PA, QA〉. Similarly, 〈PB , QB〉 = E0[2eB ]. All E0, PA, QA, PB , QB
are public parameters.
Let’s combine all the knowledge in the previous paragraphs and see how far we can go. If we
fix a point R0 = [mA]PA + [nA]QA,mA, nA ∈ Z of order 2eA then we can efficiently construct
an isogeny φA : E0 → EA having 〈R0〉 as kernel. Wait a second, we knew how to compute φA
from kernel 〈R0〉 using Ve´lu’s formula, so what’s new? The key word is ”efficient”. Note that
the kernel 〈R0〉 is a large group with 2eA elements and Ve´lu’s formula requires us to explicitly
list all the elements in the kernel. We’ll use composition of isogenies property to decompose
φA into smaller isogenies. Recall that the composition of isogenies of degree 2 is the isogeny
φk−1 ◦ φk−2 · · ·φ0 : E0 → Ek of order 2k: E0 φ0−→ E1 φ1−→ E2 φ2−→ E3 · · · φk−1−−−→ Ek. The
idea to construct φA : E0 → EA is to find φi, i = 0, · · · , eA − 1 (each has small order 2 and
hence is efficiently computable) such that φA = φeA−1 · · ·φ1 ◦ φ0, Ek = EA, φA has 〈KA〉 as
8The explicit formula is complicated, so we’ll skip it.
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kernel. Let’s see how we can construct isogeny of order 2: E0
φ0−→ E1. To do that, we need
to find a point of order 2 that generates the kernel of φ0 (recall that isogeny is determined by
its kernel). The point that we’re looking for is 2eA−1R0. Why’s that? We know that R0 has
order 2eA , i.e., 2eAR0 = 0 or 2(2
eA−1R0) = 0. In other words, 2eA−1R0 is a point of order
2 and it’s the point we’re looking for. Denote R1 = φ0(R0) then R1 has order 2
eA−1 in E1
because 2eA−1R1 = 2aA−1φ0(R0) = φ0(2eA−1R0) = 0 (note that by construction, 2eA−1R0 is in
the kernel of φ0). Using a similar argument, we see that 〈2(eA−1)−1R1〉 is the kernel of isogeny
φ1 : E1 → E2. In general, the following algorithm will construct E0, E1, · · · , EeA−1 and isogenies
φ0, φ1, · · · , φeA−1
Ei+1 = Ei/〈2eA−i−1Ri〉, φi : Ei → Ei+1, Ri+1 = φi(Ri)
Finally, after all the hard work, we’re ready to describe SIDH protocol.
Alice Bob
EA = E0/〈[mA]PA + [nA]QA〉 = E0/〈KA〉 EB = E0/〈[mB ]PB + [nB ]QB〉 = E0/〈KB〉
E0
φA−−→ EA E0 φB−−→ EB
φA(PB),
φA(QB),
EA
φB(PA),
φB(QA),
EB
EB
φ′A−−→ EAB EA φ
′
B−−→ EBA
EAB = EBA =
EB/〈[mA]φB(PA) + [nA]φB(QA)〉 EA/〈[mB ]φA(PB) + [nB ]φA(QB)〉
The starting node (elliptic curve) for both Alice and Bob is E0. Alice chooses her secret
isogeny (path) φA : E0 → EA by choosing a secret kernel KA = 〈[mA]PA + [nA]QA〉 where
mA, nA are randomly generated in {0, · · · , 2eA−1}. We know how to compute φA efficiently
from the previous paragraphs. Alice then computes φA(PB), φA(QB) and sends her public
key {EA, φA(PB), φA(QB)} to Bob. Bob chooses his secret isogeny (path) φB : E0 → EB by
choosing a secret kernel KB = 〈[mB ]PB + [nB ]QB〉 where mB , nB are randomly generated in
{0, · · · , 3eB−1}. Bob computes φB(PA), φB(QA) and sends his public key {EB , φB(PA), φB(QA)}
to Alice.
After receiving Bob’s public key, Alice uses EB , φB(PA), φB(QA) to construct isogeny φ
′
A :
EB → EAB with kernel 〈[mA]φB(PA)+[nA]φB(QA)〉. Similarly, after receiving Bob’s public key,
Bob uses EA, φA(PB), φA(QB) to construct isogeny φ
′
B : EA → EBA with kernel 〈[mB ]φA(PB)+
[nB ]φA(QB)〉.
At this point, I guess you have many questions. What are φB(PA), φB(QA) for? What does
complicated formula E0/〈[mA]φB(PA)+[nA]φB(QA) mean? As isogeny is group homomorphism,
we have φB([mA]PA + [nA]QA) = [mA]φB(PA) + [nA]φB(QA). Furthermore, we have KA =
[mA]PA + [nA]QA, so φB(KA) = [mA]φB(PA) + [nA]φB(QA). This means that φB(PA), φB(QA)
allows Alice to compute φB(KA) although Alice does not know Bob’s secret isogeny φB . This
discussion shed some light on the cumbersome formula EB/〈[mA]φB(PA)+[nA]φB(QA)〉, it is just
EB/〈φB(KA)〉. Now, let’s revisit EAB : E0 φB−−→ EB φ
′
A−−→ EAB , we have EAB = φ′A(φB(E0)) =
E0/〈KA,KB〉 = φ′B(φA(E0)) = EBA. I.e., Alice and Bob compute the same shared secret.
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4 Hash-based signatures
I won’t pretend that I can write better than chapter 14 in Dan Boneh and Victor Shoup’s
book [19] or Matthew Green [20], Adam Langley [21] excellent blog posts about hash-based
signatures, so go there and read them :) Instead, I’ll discuss a little bit about their security.
Hash-based signature scheme is the safest signature scheme against quantum computers. All
signature schemes use hash functions and hence they must rely on hash functions’ security.
All signature schemes, except hash-based signature scheme, must rely on additional security
assumption of other computational hard problems. Hash-based signature scheme, on the other
hand, only depends on the security of hash functions. Furthermore, cryptographic hash functions
are assumed to act like random oracles and as far as I know, quantum computers have limited
success on breaking unstructured functions like random oracles and the best known quantum
attack only has quadratic speedup compared to classical attacks.
In terms of applied cryptography, I recommend you never deploy stateful hash-based signa-
tures, instead use stateless hash-based signatures although the latter have lower performance.
The chance that you screw up security of stateful hash-based signatures deployment is far higher
than the chance of real general purpose quantum computers breaking your ECDSA signatures.
5 McEliece and Niederreiter’s code-based cryptosystem
McEliece code-based cryptosystem [22], [23], [24], [25] has resisted 4 decades of cryptanalysis.
Its security is based on the hardness of certain error-correcting problems which we will study
in the following section. It’s not popular because its public key is large, but its encryption and
decryption are fast. Depending on the context of cryptographic protocols, this limitation may
or may not be an issue.
5.1 Error correcting code
Let’s say we want to transfer a message m of k = 1 bit length over the wire. The message is 0
or 1. However, there may be an error in the transmission channel which might cause the bit to
be flipped. The problem is how to detect whether there was an error? Another related problem
is how can we correct the error?
If we only send the message then there is no way to solve the above problems. We have to send
extra bits to help detect the error or to correct it. Instead of sending the bit 0 (correspondingly
1), we send 00 (correspondingly 11) and if the transmission channel only has at most t = 1 bit
of error then we can detect it. Why? If the sender sends 00 and t = 1 bit of error happens
then receiver will receive 10 (if the 1st bit is flipped) or 01 (if the 2nd bit is flipped). Similar
situation happens if the sender sends 11. I.e., if the receiver receives 01 or 10, the receivers knows
that there was an error and if the receiver receives 00 or 11 it knows that there was no error.
This solves the problem of error detection, but it doesn’t solve the problem of error correction
problem. It’s not hard to convince ourselves that if we encode 0 as 000 and 1 as 111 and if the
transmission channel has at most t = 1 bit errors then we can correct the flipped bit.
Let’s pause for a moment to introduce the terminologies. The sender wants to send a message
m of length k (e.g. 0 or 1). The sender encodes the message into a different form called codeword
c of length n, n > k (e.g. 000 or 111). The transmission channel may introduce t bit error e into
c, i.e., the receiver receives cˆ = c + e where e has at most t bits 1. The receiver decodes t bit
error from cˆ to get c and deduce m from c. If the receiver can correctly fix up to t bit errors
then we say we have t-error correcting code.
In this article, we’re only concerned with binary (aka F2) linear code, i.e., we have a generator
matrix of size k× n, each matrix entry is in F2 and the codeword is c = mG. A binary message
m of size 1 × k will produce a codeword of size 1 × n. Why is it called linear code? It’s
because mG is the linear combination of rows of matrix G. In this case, we call the set C of all
codewords c a (n, k)-code. A matrix H of size (n− k)× n whose null space is C (i.e., Hct = 0)
is called parity-check matrix. Note that the kernel equation Hct = 0 is an alternative way to
define codes besides using generator matrix. Let’s see why H is called check matrix. We have
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Hcˆt = H(c+ e)t = Hct +Het = 0 +Het = Het, i.e., if there was no error (e = 0) then Hcˆt = 0.
The value Hcˆt = Het is called the syndrome of cˆ.
5.2 Goppa codes
McEliece original cryptosystem uses binary Goppa codes [26] and it has resisted cryptanalysis
for 4 decades. While it’s possible to replace binary Goppa codes with other error-correcting
codes, a few proposals using alternative codes have been broken over time. Therefore, in this
section, we briefly introduce binary Goppa codes.
We will work in finite field Fn, n = 2
m. Fix a list of n elements a1, a2, · · · , an in Fn. Choose a
degree-t irreducible polynomial g(x) ∈ Fn[x]. As g(x) is irreducible, Fn[x]/g(x) (i.e. polynomial
where coefficients are in Fn and all operations are mod g(x)) forms a finite field and hence
every element has an inverse. The binary Goppa code is defined as follow using kernel equation
Γ(a1, a2, · · · , an, g) = {c ∈ F 2n :
∑
i
ci
x−ai = 0 mod g(x)}
I guess you’re confused because in the previous section, we use matrix notation to define
error-correcting code, but here we use polynomial. What is the relationship between polynomial
form and matrix form?
Note that 1x−ai is a shortcut notation to denote the inverse of x − ai in the finite field
Fn[x]/g(x). There is an efficient algorithm to compute the inverse of x − ai and let’s denote
gi =
∑t−1
j=0 gi,jx
j the inverse of x− ai. Now, rewrite the kernel equation
∑
i
ci
x−ai = 0 mod g(x)
as follow
n∑
i=1
ci
1
x− ai =
n∑
i=1
ci
t−1∑
j=0
gi,jx
j
=
t−1∑
j=0
( n∑
i=1
gi,jci
)
xj
= 0 mod g(x)
The last equation means that xj ’s coefficient
∑n
i=1 gi,jci must be zero for all j = 0, · · · , t−1.
I.e., we have a system of equations
∑n
i=1 gi,jci = 0, j = 0, · · · , t− 1 where c = (c1, c2, · · · , cn) is
our codeword and that is our familiar matrix form of kernel equation.
5.3 McEliece’s cryptosystem
McEliece’s cryptosystem is based on the following observation. In binary Goppa codes, if the
receiver/decoder knows the generator matrix G then it’s easy to decode and correct errors in the
transmission channel. However, it’s difficult to solve the decoding problem for arbitrary (n, k)
linear code. Therefore, McEliece cryptosystem generates a generator matrix, keeps it as private
key and scrambles it to make it look random and use the scrambled version as the public key.
In details, the sender chooses k×n Goppa generator matrix G that can correct up to t errors,
k × k binary non-singular matrix S, n × n permutation matrix P . The matrices S, P are used
to hide the generator matrix G.
The public key is G′ = SGP , the private key is (S,G, P ).
To encrypt a message m of length k, choose a random error vector e that has t bits 1, compute
the ciphertext c = mG′ + e.
To decrypt c, compute cP−1 = (mG′ + e)P−1 = (mSGP + e)P−1 = (mS)G + eP−1. As
eP−1 is just a permutation of e, it has t bits 1. Therefore, with the knowledge of G, the receiver
can use an efficient decoding algorithm to deduce mS. To recover m, compute (mS)S−1 = m.
5.4 Niederreiter’s cryptosystem
Niederreiter’s [27], [25] cryptosystem is a variant of McEliece cryptosystem where it has the same
security as McEliece cryptosystem. Recall that to define error-correcting code, we can either
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use generator matrix or use parity-check matrix. McEliece cryptosystem uses generator matrix
while Niederreiter cryptosystem uses parity-check matrix.
In details, the sender chooses a (n− k)× n parity-check matrix H of Goppa codes that can
correct up to t errors, a (n−k)×(n−k) binary non-singular matrix S, n×n permutation matrix
P. The matrices S, P are used to hide the parity check matrix H.
The public key is K = SHP , the private key is (S,H, P ).
To encrypt a message m of length n and has t bits 1, compute the ciphertext c = Kmt.
To decrypt, compute S−1c = S−1SHPmt = HPmt = H(Pmt). Pmt is just a permutation
of m so it has t bits 1. With the knowledge of parity check matrix H, the receiver can use an
efficient decoding algorithm to compute Pmt and hence mt = P−1Pmt.
A Multivariate digital signatures
It’s my personal and controversial decision to not study multivariate digital signatures, but I’ll
give you my reasoning. In NIST’s 2nd round digital signature schemes, the following groups
have been chosen
• Hash-based signatures.
• Picnic signature.
• Lattice-based signatures.
• Multivariate signatures.
Hash-based signature scheme is the safest one as it only depends on hash functions’ security.
Picnic [4] is the 2nd safest signature scheme as it does not depend on number-theoretic
assumptions, instead it depends on hash functions and symmetric key block ciphers. To a certain
extent, hash functions and symmetric key block ciphers are unstructured functions and quantum
computers have limited success in breaking unstructured functions. Therefore, I have confidence
in Picnic’s security. It’s worth mentioning that even if the specific instance of Picnic is broken,
the research direction where digital signatures only depend on hash functions and symmetric key
block cipher is attractive to me as they’re both strongly resistant against quantum computers.
If the above 2 signatures scheme are not used for performance reason, we’re left with lattice-
based signatures or multivariate digital signatures. Lattice-based cryptography has been under
far more extensive cryptanalysis than multivariate cryptography. Furthermore, as we’ve seen
in chapter 2, lattice-based cryptography has many applications, so it’s worthwhile to study it
extensively. Therefore, I don’t feel the need to study multivariate digital signatures now.
References
[1] Michael Nielsen and Isaac Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum Information.
[2] Umesh Vazirani (UC Berkeley). Quantum mechanics and quantum computation.
[3] Peter Shor. Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on
a quantum computer.
[4] Gorjan Alagic, Jacob Alperin-Sheriff, Daniel Apon, David Cooper, Quynh Dang, Yi-Kai Liu,
Carl Miller, Dustin Moody, Rene Peralta, Ray Perlner, Angela Robinson, and Daniel Smith-
Tone. Report on the first round of the nist post-quantum cryptography standardization
process.
[5] Ethan Berstein and Umesh Vazirani. Quantum complexity theory.
[6] Daniel Simon. On the power of quantum computation.
21
[7] The 2nd biu winter school. https://cyber.biu.ac.il/event/
the-2nd-biu-winter-school/.
[8] Chris Peikert. A decade of lattice cryptography.
[9] Nguyen Thoi Minh Quan. Intuitive advanced cryptography.
[10] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography.
[11] A. K. Lenstra, Jr. Lenstra, H. W., and L. Lova´sz. Factoring polynomials with rational
coefficients.
[12] J.C. Lagarias and A.M. Odlyzko. Solving low density subset sum problems.
[13] Simple homomorphic encryption library with lattices (shell)
(https://github.com/google/shell-encryption).
[14] Carlos Aguilar-Melchor, Joris Barrier, Laurent Fousse, and Marc-Olivier Killijian. Xpir :
Private information retrieval for everyone.
[15] David Jao and Luca De Feo. Towards quantum-resistant cryptosystems from supersingular
elliptic curve isogenies.
[16] Craig Costello. Supersingular isogeny key exchange for beginners.
[17] David Urbanik. A friendly introduction to supersingular isogeny diffie-hellman.
[18] Craig Costello. An introduction to supersingular isogeny-based cryptography.
[19] Dan Boneh and Victor Shoup. A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography.
[20] Matthew Green. Hash-based signatures: An illustrated
primer. https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/04/07/
hash-based-signatures-an-illustrated-primer/.
[21] Adam Langley. Hash based signatures. https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/07/18/hashsig.html.
[22] Robert J McEliece. A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory.
[23] Raphael Overbeck and Nicolas Sendrier. Code-based cryptography.
[24] Tanja Lange. Code-based cryptography. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EqRsel-rXac.
[25] Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, and Christiane Peters. Attacking and defending the
mceliece cryptosystem.
[26] V.D.Goppa. A new class of linear correcting code.
[27] H. Niederreiter. Knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory.
22
